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The global rise of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and its potentially devastating consequences 
require a comprehensive regulatory framework for reducing emissions, including those from the 
transport sector. Alternative fuels and technologies have been promoted as means for reducing the 
carbon intensity of the transport sector. However, the overall transport policy framework in major 
world economies is geared towards the use of conventional fossil fuels. This paper evaluates the 
effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  current  climate  policies  for  road  transport  that  (1)  target  fuel 
producers and/or car manufacturers, and (2) influence use of alternative fuels and technologies. 
With diversifying fuel supply chains, carbon intensity of fuels and energy efficiency of vehicles 
cannot be regulated by a single instrument. We demonstrate that vehicles are best regulated across 
all fuels in terms of energy per distance. We conclude that price-based policies and a cap on total 
emissions are essential for alleviating rebound effects and perverse incentives of fuel efficiency   3 
standards and low carbon fuel standards. In tandem with existing policy tools, cap and price signal 
policies incentivize all emissions reduction options. Design and effects of cap and trade in the 
transport sector are investigated in the companion article (Flachsland et al., 2010).  
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1. Introduction 
The transport sector accounts for more than half of the oil used worldwide and roughly a 
quarter  of  energy-related  CO2  emissions  (IEA,  2008).  If  emissions  from  feedstock  and  fuel 
production are included, the transport sector is responsible for close to 27% of global greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions. The sector’s global growth rate of energy consumption during 1990-2002 
was highest among all the end-use sectors. In the USA, for instance, between 1990 and 2006, 
growth in transport emissions represented almost half of the increase in total US GHG emissions 
(EPA, 2009). 
  To prevent dangerous climate change, global emissions in 2050 will need to be at least 
halved compared to 2005 levels. Transport is supposed to play a vital role in abatement efforts. Yet 
world transport energy use and emissions are projected to increase by more than 50% by 2030 and 
will more than double by 2050 in a business-as-usual scenario. Around 75% of the projected total 
increase in world oil demand will come from the transport sector by then. While oil extraction is 
expected to peak and begin to decline in the near future, the shortfall is partially compensated with 
non-conventional oil (such as tar sands) and other fossil resources such as gas-to-liquids and coal-
to-liquids. On average, these fuels are more carbon intensive than oil, caused by upstream emissions 
in  the  supply  chain.  While  international  shipping  and  aviation  contribute  significantly  to  the 
projected rise in emissions, the highest share will still come from road transport, i.e. motorized 
vehicles.  Shifting  towards  a  sustainable,  low-carbon  transport  system  is,  hence,  imperative  for 
successful  climate  stabilization,  and  also  for  dealing  with  ever  more  problematic  congestion 
challenges in a rapidly urbanizing world.  
   5 
A variety of measures have been suggested to counter rising GHG emissions in the road 
transport  sector,  including  land-use  policies,  transport  demand  management,    infrastructure 
investments and (alternative) fuel technologies  (Kahn Ribeiro et al., 2007; Creutzig and He, 2009; 
Cervero and Murakami, 2010; Creutzig and Edenhofer, 2010). Fuel technologies are required to 
reduce the relative impact of road transport: More efficient cars and alternative propulsion systems, 
such as battery electric vehicles (BEVs), fuel cell hybrid electric vehicles, and electric bicycles can 
improve  the  energy  efficiency  and  reduce  the  carbon  intensity  of  transport.  In  fact,  the  global 
market  share  of  electric  vehicles,  such  as  battery  electric  vehicles  (BEVs)  and  plug-in  hybrid 
electric  vehicles  (PHEVs)  is  unanimously  projected  to  grow.  However,  the  extent  and  pace  of 
growth is uncertain and dependent on a number of factors. Projected market shares in the total of 
the vehicle fleet in 2020 range between 1% and 13%, with 7% as the median estimate  (BCG, 
2009). In the long term, the IEA (2009b, see also Fulton, 2010) forecasts a 50% market share in 
2050.  The  near-term  economic  potential  of  electric  vehicles  is  dependent  on  various  uncertain 
factors including energy prices (oil, electricity), battery technology and cost, economies of scale, 
recharging infrastructure, regulatory requirements and fiscal incentives. Depending on future oil 
price  and  regulation,  electric  vehicles  (including  fuel  cell  hybrid  electric  vehicles)  will  have 
between 40% and 95% market shares in 2030 in Germany (Mock et al., 2009). Electric vehicles 
have zero tail pipe emissions, but can have significant upstream emissions, e.g. when electricity is 
produced in coal powerplants. Hence, their carbon footprint
 – the total set of greenhouse gases 
(GHG) emissions caused by fuel production, supply and consumption - is less related to the vehicle 
technology but hinges on regional power supply. 
Irrespective of the detailed trajectory of their future market gains, alternative vehicles will 
imply a long-term shift in the energy used for vehicle propulsion. The fuel market for vehicles will   6 
become more diverse, and supply chains will become more complicated: Whereas conventional 
fossil fuels - gasoline and diesel - powered nearly all of road transport over the last century and still 
completely  dominate  the  fuel  market,  electricity  and  potentially  hydrogen,  but  also  non-
conventional  fossil  fuels,  such  as  the  Canadian  tar  sands,  will  provide  a  small  but  significant 
proportion  of  energy  for  vehicles  within  the  next  decade.  As  the  carbon  footprint  of  fuels 
diversifies, emissions partially decouple  from the energy content of fuels. Instead, the varying 
carbon intensity of fuels - a function of both feedstock and production process – determines the 
overall carbon footprint. From a climate perspective, only the global warming effect of these fuels 
matters. However, in the current EU and Californian policy framework, cars are regulated with 
respect to GHG emissions per distance (CO2e/km) – in the case of electric cars irrespective of the 
precise global warming potential of fuels used. Furthermore, sometimes the more environmentally-
benign fuels are more tightly regulated with respect to greenhouse gas emissions than the more 
harmful fuel: For example, in the European ETS, GHG emissions of electric rail are part of a cap-
and-trade scheme whereas conventional transport fuels are not covered by climate policies. Hence, 
providing a level playing field for all fuels becomes increasingly important to achieve efficient and 
effective abatement in the transport sector.  
 
In this paper, we review policy instruments that regulate the GHG emissions of fuels and 
vehicles. We recommend to modify and rearrange regulation in light of alternative fuels, and to 
close up the policy space by a quantity instrument, such as cap and trade. A detailed fuel pathway 
inventory reveals that alternative vehicles and fuels foster a shift in focus from tail pipe emissions to 
upstream emissions. Also, due to a number of different possible fuel pathways, life cycle emissions 
of vehicle usage partially decouple from fuel efficiency (section 2). A decomposition of transport’s   7 
GHG emissions into three factors allows for conceptualizing the match between policy instruments, 
actors, and level of regulation (section 3). Fuel efficiency standards are the most effective transport 
policy instrument currently but are not specifically designed to flexibly regulate vehicles across all 
propulsion  technologies.  Also,  the  increased  efficiency  of  the  car  fleet  is  partially  offset  by 
increased driving due to rebound effects (section 4). Renewable fuel standards seek to increase the 
market  share  of  biofuels.  However,  GHG  mitigation  effectiveness  is  severely  compromised  by 
ignoring  life  cycle  emissions.  In  contrast,  low  carbon  fuel  standards  (LCFS)  incentivize  the 
production of fuels with respect to their life cycle emissions. However, leakage, perverse incentives, 
and complex fuel supply chains of biofuels limit the absolute effectiveness of LCFSs and render 
proper evaluation difficult (section 5). A cap on total GHG emissions and associated price signal 





2.	 ﾠFuel	 ﾠpathways	 ﾠinventory	 ﾠ
To  evaluate  climate  policy  instruments  in  the  transport  sector,  accurate  and  precise 
accounting of GHG emissions throughout fuel pathways is required for two reasons: 
1.  Accounting and emission inventories of fuels are preconditions for any instrument 
that regulates fuels according to their lifecycle GHG emissions. 
2.  Understanding where emissions occur enables appropriate matching of instruments, 
emission process and actor.    8 
Fuel  pathways  in  road  transport  can  be  characterized  by  two  main  factors:  the  global 
warming  potential  (GWP)  of  its  primary  energy  source,  such  as  coal  or  wind  energy,  and  the 
efficiency loss at different lifecycle stages. In the following, we provide a brief overview on the 
lifecycle emissions of alternative feedstocks and describe the issues associated with the different 
pathways:  
•  Conventional fuels (gasoline and diesel) have a high and relatively constant GWP per unit of 
primary energy. Some GHG emissions are produced at production (e.g. 7% for diesel) and 
by processing at refineries (e.g., 12% for diesel) (CARB, 2009a). Conventional fuels are 
consumed in internal combustion engines (ICE). The majority of emissions occur at end use 
(70-90%). Therefore, the decisive emissions factor is fuel efficiency of vehicles. Diesel 
engines are more efficient than gasoline engines and produce 16-24% less emissions (Kahn 
Ribeiro et al., 2007).  
•  Unconventional fuels (e.g. Canadian tar sands) can have, at the stage of fuel production, 
about 4.5 times larger upstream GHG emissions than U.S domestic crude oil (US DOE, 
2009). However, they still constitute only about one fifth of overall lifecycle emissions. 
Hence, while fuel efficiency remains the dominant issue, carbon intensity of fuels becomes 
more important.  
•  Biofuels can follow a myriad of specific pathways, and produce GHG emissions at 
biorefineries and in agricultural feedstock production further upstream in the supply chain. 
The latter requires dealing with complex issues such as nitrous oxide emissions from 
fertilizer use (Crutzen et al., 2008), emissions from direct and indirect land use change 
(Farrell et al., 2006; Creutzig and Kammen, 2010) as well as emissions from alternative 
agricultural management practices (Kim et al. (2009). As a result, the GWP of biofuels   9 
varies dramatically with pathway. Uncertainty over life-cycle emissions can be substantial 
and make proper assessment challenging. The most market-dominant biofuel, US corn 
ethanol, is estimated to have higher life-cycle emissions than gasoline (Hertel et al., 2010).  
•  Compressed natural gas has a lower GWP than conventional fuels. Similar to conventional 
fuels, most emission occur at end use. Total life-cycle emissions are 15-25% lower than for 
gasoline engines (Kahn Ribeiro et al., 2007). 
•  Electricity can have very high GWP when produced in a coal power plant, and close to zero 
emissions when generated by renewable sources. Electric motors are significantly more 
efficient than ICEs, and total well-to-wheel efficiency of BEVs ranges between 75-85%. 
Electricity can be deployed for plug-in hybrids, full battery electric cars, or fuel cell hybrid 
electric vehicles. Alternative storage mediums such as compressed-air have well-to-wheel 
efficiency of <  30%  (Creutzig et al., 2009). 
•  About 96% of hydrogen produced globally comes from fossil fuel feedstock. More 
specifically, 48% is produced via steam methane reformation (SMR) with natural gas as the 
feedstock, 30% comes from steam reforming or partial oxidation of petroleum and 18% 
from coal gasification. Electrolysis of water provides the remaining 4% (Balat & Balat, 
2009). GHG emissions can vary considerably across these different pathways. Hydrogen can 
be deployed for fuel cell cars, hydrogen ICE vehicles, or fuel cell hybrid electric vehicles.  
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Figure 1. Overview on efficiency losses and life-cycle emissions of fuel supply chains. Numbers and 
references are given in (Creutzig et al., 2010). 
 
Figure  1  provides  an  overview  over  the  life-cycle  emissions  of  different  fuels  (see  the 
appendix for details). Figure 2 displays lifecycle emissions of different biofuels and natural gas. The 
following facts can be observed: 
•  Emissions of fossil fuels mostly occur downstream at the vehicle stage. 
•  Unconventional fossil fuels, such as those produced from Canadian tar sands, have 
significant additional emission at the stage of feedstock recovery.  
•  Emissions of alternative fuels mostly occur upstream at production stage. 
•  Emissions of BEVs or PHEVs vary considerably with upstream feedstock.  
•  Emissions of vehicles powered by hydrogen vary with vehicle technology, distribution 
system and feedstock.    11 
•  Emissions from biofuels crucially depend on specific feedstock. Uncertainties render 
accurate accounting difficult (not shown in the figure). 
Crucially, fossil fuel emissions mostly occur with end use, while alternative fuel emissions 
occur upstream. For all of these fuels, proportionality between emissions and energy intensity is 
given for specific supply chains. Due to downstream mixing of upstream supply sources, however, 
carbon  content  cannot  be  determined  from  vehicle  technology  alone.  Comprehensive  policy 
instruments need to be adaptive to varying fuel supply chains in order to provide a level playing 
field across all fuels.   
 
 
Figure 2. Overview on life cycle emissions of different biofuels and natural gas, as estimated by CARB 
(2009b).   
 
3. Decomposition of GHG emissions   12 
 Generally, total GHG emissions can be decomposed into carbon intensity of fuels, energy 
intensity of GDP, GDP per head and population (Nakicenovic et al., 2000). For transport, Figure 1 
makes  clear  that  both  carbon  intensity  of  fuels  and  fuel  efficiency  of  cars  matter.  More 
comprehensively, we decompose GHG emissions from the transport sector into carbon intensity 
(gCO2e/MJ), energy intensity (MJ/km), and total transport demand (km) (compare with Schipper et 
al., 2007; Kamaketa & Schipper, 2009;  Creutzig & Edenhofer, 2010), such that each factor of GHG 
emissions in road transport can be predominantly attributed to a distinct actor.  
 
a.  Fuel producers: carbon intensity 
b.  Car manufacturers: energy intensity 
c.  Consumers: travel demand (and realized mileage)  
Hence, policy instruments should target actors by focusing on their respective decomposed 
emissions factor. Fuel producers are responsible for the specific global warming potential of fuels. 
For example, refineries can change the mix of fuels, e.g. from tar sand oils and crudes to low carbon 
biofuels, and utilities can switch to renewable energies. The relevant measure here is the carbon 
intensity measured in gCO2e/MJ (for the absolute amount of GHG emitted, see section 6). Low 
carbon  fuel  standards,  renewable  fuel  standards  and  emissions  trading  are  possible  policy 
instruments that regulate GHG emissions of fuel producers. Car manufacturers are responsible for 
the energy intensity of their cars measured in MJ/km. For example, they can increase the efficiency 
of ICE vehicles, or switch to more efficient technologies, such as BEVs. Fuel efficiency standards 
and  vehicle  taxes  are  possible  policy  instruments  to  regulate  energy  intensity  of  cars.  Finally, 
consumers are responsible for overall transport demand. Total transport demand can be influenced 
by  spatial  planning,  infrastructure  investments  and  (local)  pricing  tools.  Transport  demand   13 
management  can  contribute  significantly  to  reduced  GHG  emissions  from  the  transport  sector. 
However, these policies are mostly locally focused and their analysis is beyond the scope of this 
study. The overall correspondence between decomposition factors, actors and possible policies is 
outlined in Figure 3.  
  
Figure 3: Decomposition of greenhouse gas emission in transportation and related policy instruments. 
 
4. Tackling energy intensity 
4.1 Existing Standards 
Fuel efficiency standards are mandated world-wide in the most important automobile 
markets in order to foster climate change mitigation and reduce oil dependency. Fuel efficiency 
standards can also effectively complement price instruments that are not fully effective due to   14 
dynamic market failures (see also Flachsland et al., 2010; Plotkin, 2008). In the following, an 
overview on fuel efficiency standards in different world regions is given. 
European  Union.  The  European  Union  started  with  a  voluntary  agreement,  setting  an 
industry-wide  target  of  140gCO2/km  to  be  reached  collectively  by  members  of  each  of  the 
European,  Japanese  and  Korean  car  manufacturers  associations.  In  2009,  as  not  all  individual 
members could fulfill their corresponding 25% reduction target, the EU mandated a industry fleet 
target of 130 g CO2/km until 2015 with additional 10gCO2/km to be achieved with complimentary 
measures, such as efficient tires, air conditioning, tire pressure monitoring, and gear shift indicators 
(EC, 2009c). As a weight-based average fleet standard, the manufacturer’s individual target depends 
on its fleet characteristics and has to be fulfilled as a fleet average. Hence, a manufacturer offering 
smaller cars has to comply with a target below 130 g/km, and a manufacturer of heavier cars has to 
comply with a target above 130 g/km. Beyond this, intermediate steps for the years 2012-2015 are 
also mandatory, e.g. 65% of the fleets must comply with the 130gCO2/km target in 2012. A long-
term target of 95 g/km is set for 2020. The latter will be reviewed in 2013. In order to foster demand 
for  fuel  efficient  vehicles,  16  of  27  EU  member  states  have  CO2-  or  fuel  efficiency  based 
registration and/or annual taxation.  
Japan.  Japan  established  mandatory  fuel  efficiency  standards  for  2010  and  2015  for 
gasoline and diesel vehicles under its Top Runner program (An et al., 2007). As in the EU, the fuel 
economy targets are specified by weight class. The targets were derived from the best performance 
of current models.  Additional acquisition taxes and annual taxes are in place. In 2009, the Japanese 
government implemented a limited tax incentive program fostering the purchase of low emitting 
and fuel efficient vehicles.    15 
China. China implemented weight-based fuel economy standards to reduce oil dependency. 
Standards are specific for the weight of each car. Currently an updated fuel economy standard for 
2012/13 is being discussed which would set fleet averages for each car manufacturer.  In addition, 
excise and sales taxes incentivize the purchase of smaller-engine vehicles (Bradsher, 2009). Current 
standards are relatively ambitious. The average new car will be required to achieve >42mpg. 
United States and California. In a joint rule making initiated by the Obama administration, 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), the US set an industry average target of 250 gCO2/mile (35.5 mpg) for vehicles in 
2016, corresponding to the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) target. As law makers allow 
EPA more flexibility in instrument design, the EPA regulation will be a little bit more stringent than 
the anticipated CAFE standard, i.e. by incentivizing  direct and indirect efficiency improvements in 
air conditioning. The fuel efficiency standard is differentiated across two vehicle classes, with 39 
mpg for passenger cars and 30 mpg for trucks in 2016. California has already imposed rules on 
automakers that started in 2009 (Pavley I). These regulations will be harmonized with federal CAFE 
and GHG standards from 2012 onwards (CARB, 2010).  
General observations. The historic development of fuel efficiency standards in different 
world regions is displayed in Figure 4. This figure is an update from An et al. with new significant 
EU, US, and Chinese regulation (2007).   The data is displayed in MJ/km – a possible measure 
of energy efficiency. 
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Figure 4. Energy intensity standards extrapolated from current volume and GHG fuel efficiency 
standards. 1 liter gasoline = 32 MJ. Data adapted from An et al. (2007) with updated fuel efficiency 
regulations. 
 
The following observations emerge: 
•  Europe and Japan lead the world in terms of fuel efficiency.  
•  The US is still a laggard, but making huge progress with recent Californian and federal 
regulation, achieving the greatest absolute emission reduction from any global policy (An et 
al., 2007). 
•  For an emerging economy China sets impressive fuel efficiency standards, which are 
motivated by energy security concerns and strategic world-market positioning. 
4.2 Evaluation 
Fuel  efficiency  standards  are  here  evaluated  according  to  their  effectiveness  and  their 
efficiency.    17 
Effectiveness. Fuel efficiency can be effective a) with respect to reducing energy intensity 
and GHG emissions per car and b) with respect to absolute reduction of GHG emissions. The first 
goal  is  generally  fulfilled,  or  will  be  fulfilled,  if  fuel  efficiency  standards  are  controlled  and 
enforceable, and penalties for non-compliances are higher than the corresponding compliance costs. 
This is the case for OECD countries, where non-compliance costs outweigh abatement costs. In 
general, fuel efficiency standards are effective in increasing fuel efficiency and reducing GHG per 
car.  
An intensity reduction in terms of lower CO2e/MJ is not necessarily equivalent to an absolute 
reduction in GHG emissions. Two different so-called rebound effects could compromise the desired 
outcome. First, car drivers could use the reduction in marginal cost from lower fuel use to increase 
total travel distance. Based on a review of 22 studies Greening et al. (2000) suggest a potential size 
of  the  rebound  effect  in  the  transport  sector  between  10%-30%,  but  highlight  the  existence  of 
unmeasured components such as changes in automotive attributes related to shifts towards increases 
in weight, horespower and acceleration of cars pruchased. The rebound effect generally decreases 
with income and increases with fuel costs and level of congestion (Small & Van Dender, 2007; 
Hymel et al. 2010). The sharp rise in oil prices in 2008 might therefore have led to stronger rebound 
effects than previously observed, but empirical evidence is currently still missing. Hence, this kind 
of rebound effect is low to moderate in magnitude and becomes less significant with rising real 
income.  
Second,  market  forces  could  induce  a  higher  additional  production  of  fuel  efficient  cars 
without inducing a simultaneous reduction in gas guzzlers. To our best knowledge, there is no 
quantitative study on this effect. In fact, for quantitative evaluation, one would need to have access 
to pricing strategies of car manufacturers.    18 
In  spite  of  moderate  rebound  effects,  total  expected  GHG  abatement  by  fuel  efficiency 
standards is significant and may be the single most effective climate policy in the transport sector 
(for quantitative evaluation see Creutzig et al., 2010). 
Efficiency. For evaluating the efficiency of fuel efficiency standards two questions can be 
posed: 1) Is the level of total induced abatement too low, more or less appropriate, or too much with 
regard to overall welfare? 2) Is this the most cost effective strategy to mitigate GHG emissions? 
In the climate change economics literature an overall reduction of global GHG emissions of 
about 80% by 2050 has been suggested to be cost efficient by some leading scholars (e.g. Stern et 
al., 2007, Edenhofer et al., 2010). For the EU, this implies a 30-40% reduction by 2020, i.e. more 
than  the  currently  envisaged  20%  reduction.  According  to  current  EU  regulation,  the  transport 
sector will reduce its GHG emissions by 7% by 2020 – and fuel efficiency standards are expected to 
contribute most of this reduction. Hence, fuel efficiency standards certainly do not induce GHG 
emission reduction that are beyond the societal optimum. The question remains whether there are 
more cost efficient options. According to published abatement cost curves, 65-80% of abatement 
options in the road transport sector below 100€/tCO2e are automobile technologies and, hence, can 
be addressed with fuel efficiency standards (e.g., Blom et al. 2007). The remaining options are 
mainly related to different kinds of biofuels. Hence, from this cost curve perspective fuel efficiency 
standards are cost-effective if the use of low-carbon biofuels is simultaneously incentivized by 
policies – which is the case in most world regions. The details of policies that address the carbon 
content of fuels is given in section 5. A comprehensive perspective on marginal abatement cost 
curves is given in the companion paper (Flachsland et al., 2010).   
Furthermore, one can ask what specific design of fuel efficiency standards is most efficient. 
For example, some world regions have fleet average requirements (e.g., EU) whereas other world   19 
regions have targets for each car of a specific weight class (e.g., China). Given the same level of 
overall ambition, the first rule is more cost-efficient, as it gives flexibility to car manufacturers in 
determining where to invest in fuel efficiency.  Effectiveness is not impacted if the fleet average 
target remains the same. 
Fuel efficiency standards are mostly attribute based, e.g. weight based in the EU and footprint 
based  (wheelbase  times  track  width  =  the  area  between  the  wheels)  in  the  US.  If  the  overall 
ambition of the fuel efficiency standard is binding, attribute-based standards do not compromise the 
effectiveness of the standard. However, they have distributional impact, as the burden of efficiency 
gain is shifted from manufacturers of heavy or big cars to those of smaller cars (compared to an 
attribute-neutral standard). Hence, from a climate-pricing perspective, gas guzzlers are underpriced 
whereas small fuel efficient cars can be overpriced. Attribute-based standards can have a regressive 
impact. In fact, attribute-based standards – to some degree - reflect industrial but not environmental 
objectives:  the  US  standard  favors  pick-up  trucks,  the  EU  standard  compact  but  heavy  sports 
vehicles, and the Chinese standard smaller domestic vehicles. Attribute-based standards are not 
necessarily  efficient.  Efficiency  (and  distributional  fairness)  could  be  guaranteed  by  setting  an 
economy  wide  fleet  average  target,  and  by  allowing  trading  of  efficiency  gains  between  car 
manufacturers.  
In  summary,  fuel  efficiency  standards  are  an  effective  and  efficient  policy  instrument  to 
reduce GHG emissions in the road transport sector – if accompanied with policy instruments that 
also  address  other  actors.  In  particular,  fuel  efficiency  standards  sufficiently  address  the 
responsibility of car manufacturers. Emissions that are outside of the control of car manufacturers, 
such as those related to the CO2 intensity of fuels, must be addressed at the appropriate level and 
directed towards other actors such as fuel producers or suppliers.    20 
 
Region  Target  Unit  Structure  Test 
EU  CO2 emissions  gCO2/km  weight-based fleet 
standard 
NEDC 




US  Fuel economy 




fleet standards for 
cars/ light trucks 
FTP 75  




China  Fuel economy  l/100km  Weight-based fleet 
standard 
NEDC 
Table 1: Overview on fuel efficiency standards in some world regions. 
4.3 Regulate vehicles by energy intensity 
In the light of the discussion in section 2 and of the overview on existing standards, what is 
the appropriate unit to evaluate the environmental (climate change) performance of automobiles? 
Vehicle fuel economy standards mandate a certain fuel use for some fixed distance traveled (e.g. 
litres/100km), or its inverse (e.g. miles per gallon). The EU explicitly sets CO2 emissions standards 
in  gCO2/km.  The  Californian  standard  goes  beyond  CO2  and  regulates  all  GHG,  including  for 
example, nitrous oxides, measuring gCO2e/mile. Here gCO2e is a shorthand for all GHG converted   21 
to CO2 equivalent units. An overview of fuel efficiency standards in different world regions is given 
in Table 1. When the GHG content of fuel is known and constant – as is the case for the current fuel 
mix  (gasoline  and  diesel)  –  then  vehicle  economy  standards  can  easily  be  translated  into  CO2 
emission standards, since fuel use directly corresponds to emissions. However, as pointed out in 
section 2, this is not true for alternative fuels, such as biofuels or electricity, where the GHG content 
is highly dependent on the fuel production process. How reasonable are each of the units? Relevant 
criteria are a) scope;  b) adequacy; and c) perception.  
Scope. Measures based on liter or gallons of fuel required are limited in scope because they 
do not explicitly take alternative fuels such as electric vehicles or fuel cell vehicles into account. 
Currently,  this  is  arguably  irrelevant.  However,  with  governments  world-wide  pushing  for 
significant market penetration of electric cars and biofuels, volume based measures become clearly 
outdated. In contrast, GHG measures fulfill the requirement of scope in so far as they in principle 
cover all cars on an equal accounting base. The Californian measure goes beyond the EU measure 
by including non-CO2 GHG emissions, such as nitrous oxides, in vehicles emissions accounting. 
Finally, energy-intensity based fuel efficiency standards, such as measures in MJ/km, would have 
sufficient scope. A conversion of MJ electricity into a equivalent volume based measures is also 
possible and under discussion. This would allow a smooth continuation of existing standards – that 
were implicitly based on energy-intensity. 
Adequacy. Adequacy in this context refers to the question how appropriate the measure is 
with  respect  to  incentivizing  fuel  efficiency  measures  of  car  manufacturers  and  simultaneously 
being  accurate.  From  this  perspective  gCO2e/km  measures  are  in  the  medium-to-long  run 
inadequate, because car manufacturers cannot influence the electricity mix which powers electric 
cars. Also, gCO2e/km changes with consumer decisions. For example, in some countries consumers   22 
can chose providers that exclusively sell electricity from renewable sources, whereas the average 
mix can be heavily dependent on coal.  
Perception. Can consumers intuitively understand fuel efficiency gains by looking at each 
of these measures? In fact, the perception aspect is not relevant for regulating car manufacturers, but 
applies to the consumer. A recent study pointed out that measures in distance per amount of fuel, 
particularly  miles  per  gallon  lead  to  systematic  misunderstanding  of  consumers.  People  falsely 
believe that the amount of gas consumed by an automobile decreases as a linear function of the 
car’s mpg, when in fact, the relationship is curvilinear (Larrick & Soll, 2008). As a result, people 
underestimate fuel savings starting from a low baseline and overestimate fuel savings starting from 
a high baseline. For example, fuel savings of a switch from 12 mpg to 14 mpg (120 gallons per 
10000 miles) outweigh fuel savings of a switch from 28 mpg to 40 mpg (107 gallons per 10000 
miles). Hence, for the purpose of purchase decisions, the US mpg values and the Japanese km/l 
values should be substituted by some measure of fuel per distance, for example gallons per 10,000 
miles or MJ/km, roughly corresponding to annual distance traveled.  
Along with our argument in sections 2 and 3, a car manufacturer’s performance should be 
measured in units of energy intensity, or volume-based equivalent measures. In the latter case, the 
performance of BEVs or PHEVs as measured in kWh/km would be translated in l/km or mpg (or 
gallons per mile) based on the kWh content of one liter or gallon of gasoline. Such measures would 
correctly address the car manufacturer’s performance. 
In summary, a number of considerations favor an evaluation of fuel efficiency in terms of 
energy intensity, e.g. MJ/km, providing a level-playing field across different kinds of cars. This is, 
however, only truly effective if GHG emissions are regulated across all fuels upstream – to also 
provide a playing level field for the carbon content. As long as this is not the case, the current EU   23 
and Californian GHG measures should stay in place, as they provide a level-playing field for the 
currently dominating gasoline and diesel fuels and vehicles. In the medium run, and in the light of 
ever-more  diversifying  fuel  supply  chains  for  all  kind  of  vehicles,  car  manufacturers  are  best 
evaluated in terms of energy intensity – the factor they can control – and cease to be evaluated in 




5. Regulating carbon intensity 
This section analyzes regulation and market-based instruments that target the carbon content 
of transport fuels. We look at renewable fuel policies and mandates, describe low carbon fuels 
standards (LCFS), highlight current implementation of LCFSs, and evaluate these implementations.   
5.1.1 Renewable fuel policies 
Biofuels have been discussed as low or zero carbon sources of energy for transportation, and 
as a suitable strategy for reducing oil dependency (e.g. von Blottnitz and Curran, 2007). Hence, the 
development of biofuels has been supported by a range of policy instruments, including volumetric 
targets  or  blending  mandates,  tax  incentives  or  penalties,  preferential  government  purchasing, 
government funded RD&D (research, development, & deployment), and local business incentives 
for biofuel companies. For example, biodiesel production in Germany jumped with the introduction 
of a tax break, and slumped again with introduction of a new tax rate (Hogan, 2009).  Another 
powerful tool that has been introduced into the policy arena over the past decade are renewable fuel 
mandates..   24 
Renewable fuel mandates require fuel producers to produce a pre-defined amount (or share) 
of biofuels and blend them with gasoline. They aim to reduce the carbon intensity of transportation 
fuels by entering larger amounts of low carbon fuels into the market without setting particular 
intensity  targets.  Some  renewable  fuel  mandates  are  non-discriminatory  in  that  they  do  not 
differentiate between different types of biofuels. From an environmental perspective this assumes 
that any renewable fuel source is less carbon intensive than conventional gasoline. However, recent 
evidence shows that this might not be generally the case (see Crutzen et al. 2007; Searchinger et al., 
2008). Discriminatory renewable fuel mandates are only applicable to a selection of biofuels or 
introduce quotas for the least carbon intensive biofuels. 
5.1.2 Implementation 
Europe. In its directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources 
(DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC), the EU mandates 10% renewable fuels used in transportation by 2020. 
This renewable fuel quota is expected to be met mostly by biofuels. The directive generally does not 
discriminate between biofuels. However, it incentives the production of biofuels on degraded land 
through a generic carbon credit, prohibits the production of biofuels on biodiverse or carbon rich 
land and rewards the production of secondary biofuels. It further requires reporting on compliance 
with sustainability criteria of major biofuel exporting countries and sets a roadmap for incorporating 
the issue of indirect land use change. 
U.S.. In the US, the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program was originally created under 
the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 2005. As required under EPAct, the RFS increases the volume of 
renewable fuel required to be blended into gasoline to 7.5 billion gallons by 2012 (RFS1). Under 
the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007, the Renewable Fuel Standard program 
will increase the volume of renewable fuel required to be blended into transportation fuel from 9   25 
billion gallons in 2008 to 36 billion gallons by 2022 (RFS2) (EPA, 2010a). The RFS1 did not 
discriminate among biofuels and the quota was met mostly by domestic corn ethanol. The RFS2 
sets explicit quota for cellulosic and other advanced biofuels, and biodiesel.  
 
5.1.3 - Evaluation 
Renewable  fuel  standards  address  the  quantity  of  renewable  fuels,  but  not  their  carbon 
intensity. This is particularly problematic as life-cycle emissions vary considerably according to 
feedstock.  The  carbon  implications  of  such  a  policy  can  therefore  also  vary  greatly.  Non-
discriminatory standards are more problematic in this context than discriminatory ones. 
The merits of the current E.U. and U.S. legislations in terms of greenhouse gas emission 
remains  unclear.  This  is  related  to  major  sources  of  uncertainties  in  the  life  cycle  of  biofuels 
including indirect land-use emissions (e.g., induced deforestation by higher world-market prices for 
ethanol) and nitrous oxide emissions, but also land management practices (Searchinger et al., 2008; 
Crutzen et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2009). Conventional corn ethanol – currently dominating the U.S. 
biofuel market - under some calculations has higher GHG life cycle emissions than conventional 
gasoline (Searchinger et al., 2008; Hertel et al., 2010). Furthermore, given the current scientific 
evidence it remains doubtful whether fulfilling the 10% renewable fuels target in transportation will 
be associated with any carbon savings (Edwards et al., 2008) . 
The Renewable Fuel Standard 2 (RFS2) requires that 36 billion gallons of biofuels be sold 
annually by 2022, of which 21 billion gallons must be advanced biofuels and the other 15 billion 
gallons can be corn ethanol. The advanced biofuels need to achieve certain life-cycle emission 
threshold (EPA, 2010b). However, this regulation is clearly insufficient for four reasons:   26 
1.  Only  biofuels  but  no  other  alternative  fuels  can  contribute  to  achieve  this  goal. 
Hence, this is a technology-specific regulation.  
2.  Only some but not all biofuels are subject to meeting threshold values. 
3.  Life cycle accounting is implemented as a step function. However, regulation needs 
to  address  fuels  proportional  to  their  GHG  emissions  to  be  both  effective  and 
efficient. 
4.  In the current regulation, life cycle accounting is not accurate. performed by relying 
on hypothetical technologies. In fact, the regulation has been critisized for relying on 
hypothetical  2022  CCS  technology  for  capturing  the  emissions  released  in  the 
refinement process as benchmark, for underestimating indirect land-use emissions, 
and for ignoring epistemic and higly relevant uncertainties related to land-use change 
(Plevin, 2010; Plevin et al., forthcoming). 
Altogether renewable fuel standards and quota are not functional as a GHG mitigation policy. 
Standards incentivize production of the most economic biofuels – often in contradiction with GHG 
emission reduction or sustainability concerns. 
5.2.1 Low carbon fuel standards 
A low carbon fuel standard (LCFS) is different from renewable fuel standards in that a) it 
mandates a specific overall decrease in the average carbon intensity of all fuels and b) it accounts 
for  the  carbon  emissions  of  each  individual  fuel,  including  non-conventional  fossil  fuels.  The 
primary purpose of a LCFS is to reduce the carbon intensity of fuels for light-duty vehicles. As 
such, a LCFS provides a level playing field across all fuels, rather than mandating specific fuels of 
the RFS. It targets fuel suppliers – refiners, importers, and blenders of passenger vehicle fuels – and 
requires that the average GHG intensity of their fuel mix be reduced by a specified percentage from   27 
a set baseline carbon intensity. This gives a supplier the flexibility to reduce emissions by switching 
fossil fuel feedstock, providing low carbon biofuels, electricity, and hydrogen, or by improving the 
efficiency of their fossil fuel supply chain. Lifecycle GHG intensity is defined as grams of carbon 
dioxide equivalent per megajoule of fuel energy (gCO2e/MJ). Non CO2-GHG, such as methane and 
nitrous oxide, are converted into CO2 equivalent emissions (CO2e). Emissions for each fuel are 
based on complete lifecycle analysis, including resource extraction, cultivation, pipeline transport, 
processing,  conversion,  production,  distribution  and  consumption.  The  maximum  average  GHG 
intensity level is reduced over time. Suppliers that reduce the average carbon content of their fuels 
below the target receive credits that can be sold to other suppliers.  
5.2.2 Implementation 
California. Executive Order S-01-07 from January 2007, issued by Californian Governor 
Schwarzenegger,  mandates  an  emission  reduction  of  10%  from  the  entire  fuel  mix  by  2020 
(Schwarzenegger,  2007;  CARB,  2009b).  The  final  rules  were  adopted  by  the  Californian  Air 
Resources Board (CARB) in April 2009; implementation started in January 2010. Gasoline and 
diesel and their substitutes have been assigned carbon intensities in gCO2e/MJ based on lifecycle 
GHG intensity, adjusted for corresponding vehicle drive–train efficiency. The so-called default and 
opt-in rule has two compoments:  First, CARB provides a conservative estimate of GHG intensity 
for each fuel (default). Second, suppliers can obtain credits by providing evidence that the fuel they 
produce has lower GHG intensity than the value calculated by CARB (opt in). The two regulated 
fuels, gasoline and diesel, and their substitutes need to decrease their GHG intensity by 10% from 
2010 until 2020 (CARB, 2009b). The LCFS utilizes market-based mechanisms to extend choices to 
suppliers  for  reducing  emissions  while  responding  to  consumers;  fuel  providers  may  a)  reduce 
emissions from processing or b) buy and blend low-carbon biofuels, such as ethanol, into gasoline   28 
or  diesel  products  or  c)  purchase  credits  from  power  utilities,  based  on  their  average  carbon 
intensity, or hydrogen owner at the point of delivery, supplying low-carbon certificates for electric 
or hydrogen vehicles. Eleven U.S. states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic Regions, and British 
Columbia and Ontario have signed letters of intent, and partial legislation, to introduce LCFS in 
coordination with California (Massachusetts Government, 2008; Taylor et al., 2008).  
European  Union.  In  the  EU,  the  Fuel  Quality  Directive  COM-2007-18  requires  6% 
reduction  in  CO2e  of  transportation  fuels  from  2010  to  2020  (EC,  2009c).  Subject  to  further 
regulation, an additional 2% reduction should be obtained through the introduction of electric cars 
and capture and storage technologies. An additional 2% reduction is to be obtained through the 
purchase of credits under the Clean Development Mechanism. The Fuel Quality Directive allows 
reduction of CO2e in the fossil fuel lifecycle, e.g. by improving the efficiency of exploration and 
processing, and also via the introduction of renewable fuels that have lower lifecycle emissions than 
conventional fuels. Indirect life cycle emissions are not (yet) part of EU life cycle accounting, 
though the Fuel Quality Directive does include certain sustainability criteria that biofuels must meet 
in  order  to  qualify  towards  meeting  the  6%  objective.  Electricity  is  not  part  of  the  6%  target; 




The LCFS will be effective in creating incentives to increase efficiency in exploration and 
processing of conventional fuels, and switching to low-carbon fuels. In the EU, most reduction in 
carbon content is expected via introduction of renewable fuels (EC, 2009c). However, due to low 
penetration of flex-fuel vehicles in Europe, a high percentage (above 10%) of ethanol in the overall   29 
fuel mix is challenging. Moreover, Edwards et al. (2008) warn about the detrimental effects policies 
could have which incentivise the use of biofuels. Hence, as a result a lower percentage of renewable 
fuels with high GHG reduction could be used, rather than a high percentage of renewable fuels with 
relatively low GHG reduction, such as CNG and biomethane (Arnold, 2009). In California, savings 
of the LCFS are estimated to be $11 billion from 2010-2020, probably realized as profits by biofuel 
producers;  25  new  biorefineries  could  be  built  (CARB,  2009b).  The  LCFS  is  the  first  policy 
implemented that successfully addresses the carbon content of all fuels in transportation, treating 
gasoline, unconventional fuels, renewable sources and electricity on equal footing. For the first 
time, a full lifecycle analysis for all fuels is required.  
However, four key shortcomings can be identified:  
1.  Leakage/Shuffling. Companies will seek to comply at lowest costs, for example by shifting 
the consumption of renewable fuels from other states to California while gasoline made 
from tar sands will be exclusively sent to non-LCFS states (Sperling & Yeh, 2009). The 
global rebound effect (additional consumption in other world regions caused by lower fuel 
prices) could be 25% percent or more in which case the LCFS is less effective than 
anticipated (Stoft, 2009). Broad or even international coverage of LCFS could reduce the 
shuffling and rebound effects (Farrell & Sperling, 2007).  
2.  Perverse incentives. From an economic perspective, the LCFS creates perverse incentives: 
The LCFS acts as a tax on high carbon fuels but as a subsidy on low carbon fuels. If demand 
and/or supply of high carbon fuels is relatively inelastic, additional production of low-
carbon fuels is incentivized which can increase total GHG emissions (Holland et al., 2009).  
3.  Uncertainty in lifecycle emissions. Lifecycle analyses of LCFSs are more comprehensive 
than those of the RFS2 in (1) including all fuels, not only biofuels, and (2) requiring precise   30 
accounting, not only thresholding crossing of emission values, and (3) not relying on 
uncertain future technologies (such as CCS) for accounting. However, major uncertainties 
with respect to indirect land-use emissions and to a lesser degree nitrous oxide emissions 
from biofuels remain, and a comprehensive policy strategy for this issue is lacking. Further 
research is needed to continuously increase the data accuracy on ILUC and update lifecycle 
emissions assumptions for all varieties of biofuels.  
4.  Inconsistency in setting incentives.  Electric utilities generate credits by fueling electric 
cars. As accounting is based on the average fuel mix, no significant incentive is given to 
reduce the carbon intensity of its electricity mix. A more encompassing instrument would 
also incentivize the electricity sector to reduce emissions.  
 
 
5.3 – Wider sustainability considerations 
The current discussions on the sustainability of biofuels very much focus on carbon aspects. 
However, there is a much wider range of issues, which needs to be considered (Yeh and Sperling, 
2010).  A  fundamental  problem  of  biofuels,  for  example,  is  food  insecurity  induced  by  land 
competition between biomass for fuels and food (Creutzig and Kammen, 2009). Other scholars have 
recently highlighted sustainability challenges associated with water use in the life cycle of biofuels 
(Gernes-Leenes  et  al.,  2009)  or  the  potentially  high  health  costs  of  air  emissions  from  first 
generation biofuels (Hill et al., 2009). Von Blottnitz and Curran (2007) find in that even though 
many biofuels showed a better performance in terms of global warming and resource use, impacts 
on  acidification,  human  and  ecological  toxicity  where  often  assessed  unfavourably.  The  strong 
focus in the political debate on climate change related issues often diverge researchers attention   31 
away  from  these  aspects  leaving  a  considerable  evidence  gap.  However,  there  is  considerable 
agreement that most of these problems can be largely overcome with the emergence of second and 
third generation biofuels. These technologies are suggested to to bring the required quantum leap in 
the improvement of the sustainability performance of these fuels to make them a viable policy 
option (Tilman et al. 2006; Tilman et al., 2009; von Blottnitz and Curran, 2007; Hill et al., 2009).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 
6. Towards GHG pricing instruments 
Policy  instruments  to  regulate  GHG  emissions  in  the  transport  sector  have  only  limited 
coverage.  While  fuel  efficiency  standards  and  low  carbon  fuel  standards  can  be  effective  and 
efficient policy instruments in their particular context, they lack comprehensive scope and fail in 
setting optimal incentives due to both generic inconsistencies and specific design. 
Fuel efficiency standards are subject to two rebound effects. First, increased market shares of 
more  efficient  cars  is  partially  offset  by  greater  demand  for  road  transport.  Second,  car 
manufacturers can react to standards through technology and innovation, shifting their automobile 
portfolio,  but  also  by  pushing  additional  fuel  efficient  cars  into  the  market  (e.g.  by  offering 
discounts). As such, fuel efficiency standards set perverse incentives. Additionally, fuel efficiency 
standards – targeting car manufacturers - are set in CO2e/km in the EU and California, capturing 
emissions  from  well-to-wheel.  However,  car  manufacturers  can  only  influence  tank-to-wheel 
efficiency and/or emissions.  
Low carbon fuel standards favor low-carbon fuels but can incentivize increased production of 
low  carbon  fuels  without  lowering  the  production  of  high  carbon  fuels.  In  its  current 
implementation, the Californian LCFS disproportionately favors electricity (counting only a third of 
GHG emissions). The upstream GHG emissions of electric cars are not strictly accounted for. Also,   32 
transport demand remains mostly unregulated, and may even increase in addition to business-as-
usual due to rebound effects.  
Some failures can be alleviated by better design, e.g. switching to energy-based efficiency 
measures  for  fuel  efficiency  standards.  However,  for  rebound  effects,  perverse  incentives,  and 
overall regulation of GHG emissions in the road transport sector, other instruments are required. 
Here  we  argue  for  quantity  instruments,  regulating  absolute  emissions,  and  an  associated  price 
signal. This can be either cap and trade, or a cap and dividend scheme. The effects of such an 
instrument would be as follows: 
•  A  transport-sector  or  economy-wide  cap  and  a  price  on  GHG  emissions  ensures 
efficiency and environmental effectiveness, and provides a level playing field across 
all fuels. 
•  Low carbon fuels are systematically incentivized. As such, a cap with corresponding 
price  signal  perfectly  complements  fuel  efficiency  standards  measured  in  tank-to-
wheel efficiency. 
•  A cap eliminates the perverse incentive effects of LCFS.  
•  An economy-wide cap makes specific and inefficient cross-sectoral regulation (e.g. the 
LCFS regulation of electricity) unnecessary.  
•  Possible rebound effects of fuel efficiency standards (higher transport demand) are 
avoided. 
•  Transport demand is subject to an economy-wide efficient price signal and becomes 
part of the overall mitigation effort.  
The main effects are summarized in Figure 5. Existing instruments, such as fuel efficiency 
standards and LCFSs, may still have an important role in a cap and price signal world. For example,   33 
efficiency  standards  are  needed  to  achieve  economy-wide  dynamic  efficiency  and  counter  loss 
aversion bias of consumers. LCFSs can be phased out as a stringent cap and credible enforcement is 
implemented. However, the accounting framework of LCFS is a crucial precondition for region-
wide  cap  and  trade  that  unsufficiently  covers  world-wide  emissions  (arising  from  agricultural 
production). As such, the Californian LCFS and the European FQD can be understood as anicillary 
steps to an economy-wide cap in these world regions. Finally, a price signal of cap-and-trade is 
unlikely to spur large-scale investments in new fuels technology if price signal is relatively low and 
cross-sector only incentivizes reductions from stationary sources in the near term. This is only a 
problem if relevant learning curve effects are expected for low-carbon biofuels, i.e. if current high 
costs of biofuel infrastructure are justified by future gains. As long as an economy-wide cap and 
price instrument is not in place, a low carbon fuel standard is a reasonable second-best policy for 
local regulators. However, both fuel efficiency standards and LCFS need to be adapted to achieve 
their primary objectives. 
Altogether, cap and price instruments would disincentivize the increased production of low-
carbon fuels that would be optimal under LCFS alone and counteract the rebound effect of fuel 
efficiency standards. An associated price signal will reduce transport demand to welfare enhancing 
levels. We conclude, therefore, that quantity instruments and a price signal can help to remedy some 
weaknesses of current standards. The companion paper (Flachsland et al., 2010) analyzes the design 
and effects of possible policy options.  
Similar  to  our  conclusions,  DeCicco  (2010)  asks  for  aligning  incentives  and  actors  when 
regulating GHG emissions in the transport sector, specifically emphasizing the need for a energy-
based metric for new vehicles. Yeh and Sperling (2010) review existing LCFS schemes and point 




Figure 5. Closing up the policy space through a cap and price instrument. A quantity target and 
pricing alleviates rebound effects and perverse incentives of fuel efficiency standards and LCFSs.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Climate change regulation in the transport sector is still in its infancy. Qualified instruments 
have been put forward, notably in California and the EU, that are effective in reducing the climate 
impact of the transport sector. However, with diversified fuel supply chains and rising alternatives 
to the internal combustion engine, existing policy instruments need to further evolve to ensure 
efficiency in terms of setting harmonized incentives across different technologies and fuel chains, 
and effectiveness in achieving emission reduction objectives.  In this article, we elucidate that most   35 
GHG emissions of ICE vehicles and fuels occur at tank-to-wheel (downstream), but emissions of 
alternative fuels tend to occur at well-to-tank (upstream). Emissions in the transport sector can be 
decomposed into carbon intensity, energy intensity and travel demand. Regulation aimed at curing 
market failures needs to address each decomposition factor to appropriately target and incentivize 
the  corresponding  actors  to  reduce  their  emissions  factor.  Hence,  volume  and  GHG-based  fuel 
standards  need  to  evolve  towards  energy  intensity  based  fuel  standards  and  complementary 
regulation  of  upstream  GHG  emission  to  coherently  address  alternative  fuel  vehicles,  such  as 
electric  cars.  Distance  should  also  always  be  in  the  denominator  to  align  perception  with  fuel 
savings.  
Renewable fuel standards suffer from ignoring or insufficiently addressing the GHG content 
of biofuels. Low carbon fuel standards are more comprehensive than renewable fuel standards  in 
regulating  the  GHG  content  of  transport  fuels.  Lifecycle  issues,  however,  are  not  completely 
resolved.  As  an  intensity-based  standard,  perverse  incentives  may  partially  counteract  carbon 
intensity reduction by volume augmentation.  
Finally, a cap and price signal can address the drawbacks of existing regulation. In principle, 
both emissions trading and GHG taxes can be used to achieve effectiveness and efficiency as both 
instruments directly tackle greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, both simultaneously address all driving 
factors for road transport emissions with one harmonized instrument. A comprehensive analysis of 
quantity-based instruments is given in the companion paper (Flachsland et al., 2010).  
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